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In the subzero temperatures of February 2015, the unionized
employees of MFY Legal Services1 (MFY) waged a three-and-a-halfweek strike against their employer.2 At issue in this labor dispute
were securing pay equity for the organization’s lowest paid
† Brian J. Sullivan and Jota Borgmann are members of the National Organization
of Legal Services Workers, UAW Local 2320, and were on the union bargaining team
during the strike discussed in this article. Brian would like to thank his partner Erica
Chutuape and his daughters Maya and Cece. Jota thanks Becky and James Borgmann
for their support and the MFY shop for its hard work, enthusiasm, and determination
throughout the 2015 contract campaign. Both authors offer a heartfelt thank you to
Jessica Cepin, who served with us on the bargaining team and provided feedback on
an early draft of the article, and to Anamaria Segura and David Ureña, who provided
crucial leadership during the strike and assistance with this article.
1 MFY provides free legal assistance to residents of New York City on a wide range
of civil legal issues, prioritizing services to vulnerable and under-served populations,
while simultaneously working to end the root causes of inequities through impact
litigation, law reform and policy advocacy. See About MFY, MFY, http://www.mfy.org/
about/about-mfy/ [https://perma.cc/HYE2-HMWC].
2 See MFY Legal Services Employees on Strike, UAW LOCAL 2320 (Feb. 1, 2015), http:/
/www.nolsw.org/index.cfm?zone=/unionactive/view_article.cfm&homeID=467929
[https://perma.cc/KU2V-LCKF] (discussing MFY’s unionized employees’
overwhelming 90% vote to go on strike following their rejection of management’s
contract proposal).

195

196

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:195

employees, parental leave for all employees, and ensuring that the
organization offered a benefits package that would retain a longterm, experienced, and diverse staff.3 Together, these demands
would improve labor conditions at MFY and, consequently, would
improve the quality of services delivered to the organization’s
clients.
Some observers wonder why legal services workers, especially
lawyers, would require a union and why they would need to strike
for better working conditions. Why wouldn’t the interests of a
nonprofit organization with a social justice mission be aligned with
those of its workers? The answer lies in the devastating cuts to
social services in New York City and the U.S. over the past several
decades. These cuts have imperiled New York City’s low-income
population and undermined the economic position of working
New Yorkers. While nonprofit organizations have stepped in to
deliver services to compensate for an inadequate safety net, the
competitive, market-like bidding for public and private grants has
led to a “race to the bottom” style of administration in the
nonprofit sector.
In this article, two members of the union’s negotiation team
will discuss the political and economic context of the 2015 strike
and why this strike was and is important for the future not only of
MFY’s clients and workers, but for legal services generally. In Part I
of this article, we will briefly describe New York City’s turn towards
neoliberalism4 and the effect this turn had on social services
generally, and legal services in particular. We will analyze how New
York City, New York State, and federal social service policy changed
between the late 1960s through the present day, and how legal
services in general, and MFY in particular, reacted to these
changes. This analysis will help to explain why MFY’s workers
found themselves in a contentious contract negotiation with MFY’s
management at a time of unprecedented growth and prosperity for
the organization. In Part II, we will describe the concrete details of
3 See Why MFY Is on Strike, UAW LOCAL 2320 (Feb. 5, 2015), http://
www.nolsw.org/index.cfm?zone=/unionactive/view_article.cfm&homeID=468433
[https://perma.cc/KL5G-NX9B].
4 KIM MOODY, FROM WELFARE STATE TO REAL ESTATE 18 (2007) (“[Neoliberalism
is a] restraint on social spending, privatization, deregulation, and, most importantly,
the reassertion of class power by the nation’s capitalist class.”); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF
HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (“[Neoliberalism is a] theory of political
economic practices that propose that human well-being can best be advanced by
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free
trade.”).
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the contract campaign and resulting strike, explaining how both
were organized and executed. This section walks through the
campaign chronologically, from the formulation of our demands,
through negotiations at the bargaining table, to the strike itself. We
conclude with some reflections on how the victories we won in our
strike and recent changes in the legal services funding landscape
will affect MFY workers and our clients going forward.
Between the 1930s and 1960s, New York City benefited from
relatively healthy social democratic spending at the City, State, and
federal levels.5 Towards the end of this period, MFY was both a
leader in providing Civil Legal Services (CLS) and was also
involved in ambitious political agitation, such as Frances Fox
Piven’s successful welfare reform campaign.6
Unfortunately, the 1970s saw a major rightward shift in City
politics. Especially after the New York City fiscal crisis in 1975,
social spending was sharply curtailed and the City’s social
democratic policy was cut back.7 We will trace this neoliberal shift
through the 1980s, including President Reagan’s attempt to
defund legal services at the federal level through the elimination of
the Legal Services Corporation.8 This trend continued in New York
City under mayors Dinkins, Giuliani, and Bloomberg, during which
time multiple non-union CLS providers were established,9 and
competitive battles for funding drove working conditions down.10
Looking at the immediate lead-up to our strike, we will analyze
changes in the CLS landscape, social spending in the Bloomberg
years, and the massive infusion of state money that resulted from
the advocacy of Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of the Court of
Appeals.11 Of particular importance to our strike was the 2013
MOODY, supra note 4, at 16-17.
Tyler Kasperek Somes, The Legal Services NYC Strike: Neoliberalism, Austerity and
Resistance, 71 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 1, 12 (2014).
7 Kim Phillips-Fein, The Legacy of the 1970s Fiscal Crisis, NATION (Apr. 16, 2013),
http://www.thenation.com/article/legacy-1970s-fiscal-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/
PZ78-3M3Q].
8 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Legal Aid for the Poor: Reagan’s Longest Brawl, N.Y. TIMES (June
8, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/08/us/legal-aid-for-the-poor-reagan-slongest-brawl.html.
9 For instance, the New York Legal Assistance Group was founded in 1990. See
About Us, N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRP., http://nylag.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/
J3CK-KA2M].
10 MOODY, supra note 4, at 162 (discussing the Bloomberg administration’s cuts to
social service contracts in the early years).
11 William Glaberson, Judge’s Budget Will Seek Big Expansion of Legal Aid to the Poor in
Civil Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at A21.
5
6
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strike at Legal Services of New York City (LSNYC), a labor struggle
from which we learned many lessons.
It was in this larger context that we embarked on our contract
campaign in the final months of 2014. Despite the significant cuts
in social spending that have been a central component of
neoliberal New York, MFY as an organization was fiscally healthy in
2014 (in part because of past concessions that the union had
made). The unionized staff was also particularly well-organized and
militant. Thus, both objective and subjective conditions made 2014
a good time to mount an ambitious contract campaign. We will
describe how we organized ourselves, took inspiration from the
history of labor resistance, and accomplished the strike itself.
Ultimately, the strike was highly successful. Though we had to
make some tough concessions, we achieved all of our central goals.
Therefore, our strike must be viewed not only in light of the steady
push towards austerity that has characterized social services policy
for the past fifty years, but also in light of labor’s tradition of
resistance to neoliberalism.12
I.

SOCIAL SERVICES

AND THE

RISE

OF

NEOLIBERAL NEW YORK

Many persons seem to cringe at the thought of the federal government financing litigation against state and local governments—especially if the
result is to raise the local tax bite to support the poor.13
A.

The 1960s and the Early Days of Mobilization for Youth

Mobilization For Youth, the precursor organization to the formation of MFY Legal Services in 1968, was founded in 1961 with
federal grants offered by the Kennedy administration.14 Mobilization For Youth offered a broad range of social services, including
welfare advocacy, legal services, services for low-income youth, and
a host of other human services.15 At the time, civil legal services
were only a small part of Mobilization For Youth’s work. In addition to social services, Mobilization For Youth “conducted aggressive community organizing campaigns that included rent strikes
against negligent slum owners, education boycotts against school
See infra Part I(C).
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 1, 191 (2d ed. 2004) (citing Fred P. Graham, Lawyers for the Poor
Take on City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1969, at 137).
14 DOLORES SCHAEFER, MFY LEGAL SERVICES, INC.: MOBILIZING FOR JUSTICE SINCE
1963, at 2 (2013), http://www.mfy.org/wp-content/uploads/MFY-History-50th-Anniversary1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW96-9QXC]; About MFY, supra note 1.
15 SCHAEFER, supra note 14, at 3.
12
13
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segregation, and demonstrations at construction sites demanding
jobs for people of color.”16
Most famously, in the mid-1960s, Mobilization For Youth
waged a pitched battle against New York City political and economic elites to secure welfare rights for the City’s poor and working class residents.17 This broad-based social struggle provided the
groundwork for some of MFY’s most enduring legal achievements.
MFY paralegal Una Perkins represented John Kelly when he was
denied welfare benefits based on alleged fraud.18 At the time, welfare recipients were not afforded any due process rights prior to
termination of their benefits.19 Acting on behalf of all New Yorkers
denied benefits without due process, Mr. Kelly challenged the
City’s summary denial of his benefits. The case was ultimately decided by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark decision Goldberg v. Kelly.20
In its combined strategy of social organizing and legal advocacy, MFY embraced a robust practice of poverty law.21 However,
MFY’s most ambitious years of social organizing were cut short
when political winds began to shift in the mid to late 1960s. At the
federal level, President Richard Nixon was inaugurated in 1969,
and the coded racism of his national election strategy—which ultimately paved the way for Ronald Reagan’s attack on the welfare
system and racialized references to the “welfare queen”22—would
Somes, supra note 6, at 11-12.
Tamar W. Carroll, “To Help People Learn To Fight”: New York City’s Mobilization for
Youth and the Origins of the Community Action Programs of the War on Poverty, GOTHAM
BLOG (Oct. 8 2015), http://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/to-help-people-learn-tofight-new-york-citys-mobilization-for-youth-and-the-origins-of-the-community-actionprograms-of-the-war-on-poverty#_edn2 [https://perma.cc/3XX7-6263].
18 Una Perkins: 40 Years at MFY and Going Strong, MFY FYI (MFY Legal Servs., New
York, N.Y.), Spring-Summer 2009, at 4, http://www.mfy.org/wp-content/uploads/
fyi/FYI-Spring-Summer-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6GA-GMVA].
19 Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1252 (1965).
20 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a recipient of certain government benefits must be granted an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of such benefits).
21 In a fundamental sense, poverty law refers to the new form of legal practice that emerged during the ‘War on Poverty’ of the 1960s, a form of
practice that transcended the traditional legal-aid model of providing
individual representation in unconnected and usually private-law matters, and instead sought to enlist the law in a systemic effort to achieve
social and structural changes that might alleviate poverty itself.
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural Constitutional Law
Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1240-41 (2006).
22 See Kathryn J. Edin & H. Luke Shaefer, Ronald Reagan’s “Welfare Queen” Myth:
How the Gipper Kickstarted the War on the Working Poor, SALON (Sept. 27, 2015), http://
16
17
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significantly affect the public services landscape in New York City.
The specter of the urban malingerer became a potent tool in a
bipartisan effort to roll back the gains of the past decades.23
Reflecting these changing political and economic conditions,
in the mid-1960s, Mobilization For Youth found itself in a battle for
its existence. Because of its involvement in the welfare rights movement, the organization came under the scrutiny of the New York
City Police Department and City Council President Paul Screvane,
who withheld the organization’s funding in 1964.24 Mobilization
For Youth was accused of inciting racial violence in Harlem and of
being “a suspected Red honeycomb for leftists.”25 The organization
ultimately survived this leftist witch-hunt, but in 1968, MFY Legal
Services split apart from the broader organization to focus on litigation and individual representation.26 While this move was a reaction to a hostile political environment, it did pave the way for the
organization’s staff to ultimately unionize into the Legal Services
Staff Association (LSSA). This happened in 1972, when LSSA
formed as a wall-to-wall union.27 This organizational form would
prove to be of crucial significance throughout LSSA’s history, and
particularly in MFY’s 2015 strike.

www.salon.com/2015/09/27/ronald_reagans_welfare_queen_myth_how_the_gipper
_kickstarted_the_war_on_the_working_poor/ [https://perma.cc/94FC-K3DA] (“Although negative racial stereotypes had plagued welfare throughout its existence, the
emphasis on race was more widespread and virulent after Reagan turned his focus to
the system. His welfare queen soon became deeply ingrained in American culture.
She was black, decked out in furs, and driving her Cadillac to the welfare office to
pick up her check. None of these stereotypes even came close to reflecting reality,
particularly in regard to race.”). See generally Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare
Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014); KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK LIBERATION (2016) (analyzing how the neoliberal assault on welfare and social spending was particularly
devastating to African Americans).
23 See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 247 (2014) (detailing the use of the welfare queen rhetoric by courts and politicians all the way up to 2012’s presidential race where “Governor Romney was able to trigger the stereotypes underlying the welfare queen,
through his welfare attack ads in order to seek an advantage among white voters”).
24 Homer Bigart, City Hunts Reds in Youth Project on East Side, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
1964), http://www.nytimes.com/1964/08/17/city-hunts-reds-in-youth-project-on-theeast-side.html?_r=0.
25 Id.
26 Somes, supra note 6, at 14.
27 A “wall-to-wall” union is one in which all staff, not just professionals or certain
workers, are joined together in a single union. See Union History, LSSA 2320, http://
lssa2320.org/members/union-history/ [https://perma.cc/5SA5-854W].
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The Fiscal Crisis and the Dawn of Neoliberal New York

While the late 1960s and early 1970s were turbulent political
times, the New York City fiscal crisis of 1975 ushered in a dramatic
neoliberal reorganization of the City. As demonstrated by scholars
such as Kim Moody and Robert Fitch, the 1970s saw New York
City’s political and economic elites embrace the neoliberal project.28 As David Harvey has commented, New York City’s case was
“iconic,” and the “management of the New York fiscal crisis pioneered the way for neoliberal practices both domestically under
Reagan and internationally through the IMF (international monetary fund) . . . .”29 Through management of the crisis, City elites
“emphasized that the role of government was to create a good business climate rather than look to the needs and well-being of the
population at large.”30
Thus, while government at both the local and federal level responded to the urban unrest of the 1960s with greater social spending and an expansion of welfare benefits, by the 1970s this
response had been replaced by a program of harsh austerity. As
Kim Moody explains in his history of New York City, From Welfare
State to Real Estate, the worldwide recession of the mid-1970s hit
New York City particularly hard. The global recession “affected
America’s other ailing cities . . . causing widespread fiscal distress,
but given New York’s central place in the world economy, [it] hit
New York harder and at a sharper angle.”31
This fiscal crisis gave the City’s elites their long-awaited opportunity to significantly cut social spending. These cuts did not come
to fruition until the Koch administration several years later, but, as
one business executive commented in 1973, “If we don’t take action now, we will see our own demise. We will evolve into another
social democracy.”32 Ultimately, cuts to social spending were a crucial component of New York City’s shift to neoliberalism.33 “Restraint on social spending, privatization, deregulation, and, most
importantly, the reassertion of class power by the nation’s capitalist
class are at the center of the neoliberal project.”34
The administration of Mayor Ed Koch, spanning three terms
28 See ROBERT FITCH, THE ASSASSINATION OF NEW YORK 145-84 (1993); MOODY, supra
note 4, at 18.
29 HARVEY, supra note 4, at 48.
30 Id.
31 MOODY, supra note 4, at 16.
32 Id. at 18.
33 See id.
34 Id.

202

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:195

between 1978 and 1989, would cement many of the neoliberal
changes being imposed on the City, and would set the mold for
social services in the decades to come.35 Koch employed a clever
strategy in instituting austerity in social services: at the same time
that he significantly cut social spending, he poured money into the
nonprofit sector, making the professionals who ran nonprofit organizations “think twice about advocacy actions that might annoy the
mayor.”36 Thus, there was a paradoxical quality to Koch’s policy: he
dedicated significant resources to the NGO sector but undermined
grassroots political action and encouraged an overall deterioration
of conditions for working class and poor New Yorkers.37 His neoliberal social policy expressed itself in New York City’s surging
homeless population, the introduction of tuition at formerly free
CUNY campuses, subway fare hikes, layoffs of City workers, and
hospital closures.38
Federal policy would follow a similar course. In 1974, Congress
passed legislation creating the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a
private nonprofit corporation that distributes funding for legal services for poor people.39 While the LSC represented a large source
of reliable funds for legal services, it also limited the terrain on
which poverty law could be practiced. In the 1980s and 1990s, the
federal government would place sharp restrictions on the law practices of those organizations that accepted LSC money.40
During this period, New York City’s public sector unions, particularly District 1199, grew dramatically.41 Despite this numeric
growth, most workers in the City saw a slow but steady decline in
wages and working conditions. It was in this climate that LSSA went
on strike in 1977 and 1979. While the 1977 strike was fast, lasting
only one week, the strike in 1979 lasted eleven weeks, stretching
out through the winter. In both actions the union fought off
givebacks pertaining to control over staff working conditions, and
35 See Samuel Zipp, Burning Down the House: On Ed Koch, NATION (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/burning-down-house-ed-koch/ [https://perma.cc
/3VQW-LKE2].
36 MOODY, supra note 4, at 65.
37 See id. at 66-80.
38 See id. at 39, 73-74, 80; see generally JONATHAN SOFFER, ED KOCH AND THE REBUILDING OF NEW YORK CITY (2011).
39 Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zachs, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the
Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
40 See Michael Serrill, Law: An Organization at War with Itself, TIME, Oct. 3, 1983.
41 See Michelle Chen, How Did New York Become the Most Unionized State in the Country?, NATION (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-did-new-york-be
come-most-unionized-state-country/ [https://perma.cc/5TN8-8CL6].
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won important victories such as wage increases and retirement
benefits.42
However, things did not improve for all legal services workers
in the 1980s. Immediately after taking office, President Ronald
Reagan sought to eliminate the LSC,43 a move which, if successful,
would have effectively destroyed legal services. Reagan’s position
was a piece of his larger strategy to slash welfare and other social
services.44 Having recently affiliated with the United Auto Workers
(UAW), the unionized employees of LSSA fought these spending
reductions tooth and nail, ultimately prevailing when Reagan’s draconian cutbacks were rejected.45
New York City, meanwhile, gave considerable tax breaks and
other subsidies to large developers.46 Mayor Koch continued the
path he commenced at the beginning of his term, overseeing a glut
in commercial and residential development and devoting fewer resources to improving the lives of working class and poor New
Yorkers.
C.

Deepening Austerity and the New Social Services Landscape

The 1990s saw local and national policy attacks against legal
services that accompanied larger policy attacks against poor people. Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the so-called “welfare reform”
legislation that created work requirements for recipients of public
assistance47 and a five-year lifetime limit on benefits.48 Almost
twenty years after its passage, the country saw a sharp increase in
the number of families living in deep poverty, i.e., at incomes below
half of the poverty line.49 In the same year, Congress passed new
restrictions on LSC funding, prohibiting representation of undocumented immigrants and litigants participating in class action lawSee Union History, supra note 27.
Taylor, supra note 8.
44 Somes, supra note 6, at 14.
45 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Plan Gains to Raise Funds to Pay for Legal Services for Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1984, at 1; Union History, supra note 27.
46 FITCH, supra note 28, at 146.
47 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 824, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
48 See id. § 408(a)(7).
49 CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
TANF 6 (June 15, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-2210tanf2.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8EA-SSSL] (“[T]he number of families in deep poverty rose between 1996 and 2013, from 2.7 million to 3 million.”).
42
43
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suits.50 State and federal budget cuts at this time also forced MFY to
close its neighborhood storefront offices and consolidate to one
location.51
In New York City, these cutbacks were paired with policy shifts
favoring elites. Mayor David Dinkins bolstered the already-powerful
real estate industry, continuing Koch’s policies of privatization and
subsidies for the super wealthy, accompanied by feeble attempts to
expand the City’s safety net.52 It was early in the Dinkins administration that LSSA would fight, and win, one of its most important
strikes. For sixteen grueling weeks in 1991, LSSA waged a pitched
battle against Legal Services of New York City (LSNYC). The victories of that strike, including “rationaliz[ing] wage scales on the basis of seniority, obtain[ing] unprecedented wage increases,
eliminat[ing] discretionary raises, [winning] a strong policy against
sexual harassment, [and winning] retroactive pension contributions for our long-time members,”53 put in place the basic framework under which legal services workers labor today. The 1991
strike made legal services a viable long-term career option for attorneys, paralegals, and administrative staff.
In 1993, Dinkins was replaced as mayor by Rudolph Giuliani,
whose racist policing tactics,54 disregard for all but the wealthiest
New Yorkers,55 and dedication to austerity56 no matter the human
costs would make him a symbol of all that had gone wrong for the
City’s most vulnerable. For legal services workers, the Giuliani administration would prove to be a powerful adversary.57 Mayor Giuliani attacked unionized legal services, threatening lawyers striking
at Legal Aid Society with the loss of their jobs,58 and forcing them
to accept a contract without pay increases after the union and man50 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, §504(a)(7), (11), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
51 Chinatown MFY Office Shuts, TENANTNET, http://www.tenant.net/tengroup/
Metcounc/Mar96/mfy.html [https://perma.cc/Y83N-C6XK]; Andrew Jacobs, Neighborhood Report: Chinatown; Legal Lifeline for Asian Poor Gets Budget Ax, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
5, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/05/nyregion/neighborhood-report-chi
natown-legal-lifeline-for-asian-poor-gets-budget-ax.html.
52 MOODY, supra note 4, at 119-21.
53 Union History, supra note 27.
54 TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 124.
55 MOODY, supra note 4, at 133.
56 Jonathan P. Hicks, To Black Audience in Brooklyn, Mayor Promotes Austerity Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/14/nyregion/toblack-audience-in-brooklyn-mayor-promotes-austerity-plan.html.
57 See Alison Mitchell, Mayor Moves to Cut Role of Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/06/nyregion/mayor-moves-to-cut-role-oflegal-aid.html.
58 Alison Mitchell, Giuliani and Striking Lawyers: Sending a Message, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
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agement had reached a tentative agreement that included modest
bonuses.59 Giuliani immediately sought out alternative providers of
indigent criminal defense to scale back funding for Legal Aid Society.60 By 1998, the City had established contracts with several nonunionized organizations including Bronx Defenders and Brooklyn
Defender Services.61 A report that year by the Indigent Oversight
Panel of the Appellate Division, First Department, found that Legal
Aid Society lawyers were overworked, handling an average of 650
cases each, and that the overall quality of indigent legal defense
had declined.62
In 2002, MFY dissociated itself from LSNYC (then LSNY), with
the most experienced advocates remaining in LSNY’s Manhattan
office and the newer staff splitting off with MFY.63 Right away,
MFY’s management issued a layoff notice to a member of the support staff, which the shop64 successfully fought. In the first round
of contract negotiations after the split, management demanded significant givebacks in health care, sick and vacation leave, and family medical leave.65 In October 2003, the nineteen-member shop
went on strike for nine weeks and successfully fought off many of
management’s demands.66 As one of the MFY strikers described it,
“[s]hop members came back from the strike unified and support5, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/05/nyregion/giuliani-and-striking-lawyers-sending-a-message.html.
59 See Mitchell, supra note 57.
60 Id.
61 David Rohde, Decline Is Seen in Legal Help for City’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26,
1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/26/nyregion/decline-is-seen-in-legal-helpfor-city-s-poor.html.
62 Id.
63 See Union History, supra note 27.
64 “A ‘union shop’ is an establishment in which the employer by agreement is free
to hire nonmembers as well as members of the union but retains nonmembers on the
payroll only on condition of their becoming members of the union within a specified
time.” 41 CAL. JUR. 3d Labor § 236 (2016).
65 See Union History, supra note 27 (“MFY began raiding other legal service programs’ funding and did its best to drive a wedge between its employees and the rest of
LSSA, while setting out at the same time to bust the union at MFY with disastrous
giveback demands and complete intransigence in bargaining. In an oft-quoted exchange, the MFY project director gave staff five minutes to decide whether they would
accept her offer, whereupon staff replied, ‘We don’t need five minutes.’ ”).
66 Lisa Belkin, Paycheck Goes, and the Dominoes Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/23/jobs/life-s-work-paycheck-goes-and-the-dominoes-fall.html (“The MFY office went on strike the week of Halloween. It is a small
workplace, 19 people in all, including the lawyers and support staff.”); Union History,
supra note 27 (“It was actively supported by the rest of LSSA, garnered widespread
support, and ultimately produced a contract much closer to the union’s initial position than to management’s.”).
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ive. We started having lunch together every day and we had each
other’s back.”67
One year before the 2003 strike, the New York City mayoralty
passed to billionaire Michael Bloomberg. His administration continued social policies and a budget that emphasized tax abatements
for the rich, development of luxury housing, and impairment of
public education, all at the expense of remedial social policies for
poor and working class New Yorkers.68 Half way through the administration’s five-year plan to reduce homelessness, the City saw
the greatest rise in homelessness since 1982, when it first began
counting the number of people in the City’s shelters.69 The financial crisis that began in 2008 dramatically increased evictions as
funding for rent subsidies decreased.70
As mayor, Bloomberg honed some of the tactics pioneered in
the Koch years.
Ed Koch had skillfully used city contracts with nonprofit social
agencies to buy, not so much loyalty, as acceptance and lack of
resistance to his economic policies. Bloomberg also appeared to
employ city contracts as a way of gaining widespread goodwill. In
fact, the number of city contracts exploded from 6,849 valued at
$9.9 billion in [fiscal year] 2000 to 17,402 worth only $7.5 billion in [fiscal year] 2006.71

It was within this context of nonprofits being pushed to do
more with a shrinking budget that MFY management felt justified
in rejecting LSSA’s demands in order to stay “competitive” in bidding for City and other contracts, thus paving the way for the 2015
MFY strike.
In 2013, a decade after MFY’s 2003 strike, LSSA again found
itself on the picket line, this time battling savage cutbacks at
LSNYC. Claiming impending fiscal catastrophe, LSNYC’s management demanded a series of exceptional givebacks that would have
“interrupted physical therapy and mental health treatments midstream” and would have “removed fertility procedures as an affordable treatment option; imposing a heteronormative condition on
gay, lesbian, transgender and gender non-conforming couples
67 Email from an LSSA member who participated in the 2003 strike (Oct. 2013)
(on file with authors).
68 MOODY, supra note 4, at 158.
69 Leslie Kaufman, City Vows to Improve Aid to Homeless Families, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/nyregion/19homeless.html.
70 Alan Feuer, Homeless Families, Cloaked in Normality, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/nyregion/ordinary-families-cloaked-in-a-veilof-homelessness.html.
71 MOODY, supra note 4, at 162.
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which had not existed previously.”72 In reality, while years of austerity had harmed LSNYC’s budget, the organization’s fiscal problems
were not as severe as its management claimed. To the extent
LSNYC had fiscal problems, they were sharply exacerbated by the
organization’s top-heavy management structure.
LSSA mounted a courageous and successful counter-attack,
striking for forty days in the summer of 2013.73 Building rank-andfile power and involvement through a series of escalating actions,
LSSA mobilized broad support both within and outside its membership. The union drew critical attention to the outsized role of
LSNYC’s corporate board in setting the organization’s labor policy
and broader strategy.74 The union succeeded in both fighting off
the most draconian givebacks and in articulating a rich vision for
legal services, one in which low-income New Yorkers would receive
ambitious services provided by experienced advocates.
Shortly after LSSA’s strike ended, CLS received an infusion of
new funding it had not seen in decades.75 Chief Judge Lippman of
the New York State Court of Appeals had begun calling for significant increases in funding for legal services in the state budget and
for a right to counsel for civil litigants, particularly those facing
eviction.76 At the same time, he promoted volunteerism amongst
the bar in a relatively soft job market as it continued to recover
from the 2008 financial crisis.77 It was in this context, and drawing
on the hard lessons learned by labor over the past several decades,
that the unionized staff of MFY embarked on its 2015 contract
campaign.
Somes, supra note 6, at 15.
Erik Forman, In a Blow Against Austerity, Legal Services Strikers Win Contract, IN
THESE TIMES (June 28, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/
15200/strike_victory_at_legal_services_nyc_neoliberalism [https://perma.cc/BLY3ZZTM]; Legal Services NYC Strike Ends After 40 Days, LSSA 2320, http://lssa2320.org/
legal-services-nyc-strike-ends-after-40-days-as-employees-ratify-contract-that-maintainsbenefits-adds-job-security-assurances/ [https://perma.cc/7XUA-WLE7].
74 Striking Workers Confront LSNYC Board of Directors, LSSA 2320, http://lssa2320.
org/striking-workers-confront-lsnyc-board-of-directors/ [https://perma.cc/MZY2XU4S].
75 Carey R. Dunne, City Bar President Applauds Increase in Civil Legal Services Funding
in Judiciary Budget, N.Y.C. BAR: 44TH STREET BLOG (Nov. 30, 2012, 2:27 PM), http://
www.nycbar.org/44th-street-blog/2012/11/30/city-bar-president-on-judiciarybudget/ [https://perma.cc/2RHL-T3MY].
76 Terry Carter, Judges’ Efforts to Pursue Funding for Unmet Civil Legal Needs Garner
Applause at LSC Conference, ABA J. (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/mo
bile/article/lsc_40th_anniversary [https://perma.cc/6XNX-36PF].
77 Joel Stashenko, Lippman Proposes Student Pro Bono Program, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 13,
2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202642530145/Lippman-ProposesStudent-Pro-Bono-Program [https://perma.cc/6TKY-SGMJ].
72
73
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We are unstoppable! A fair contract is possible.
–A popular chant by the MFY Shop
on the picket line in February 2015
Our campaign for a fair contract in 2015 started months
before we sat down across the table from the MFY management
negotiation team. We went into contract negotiations knowing that
a negotiation team’s power is not based on clever and articulate
arguments, or on force of will, but on the strength and resolve of
the members of the union. With this in mind, our shop had taken
pains to build the contract campaign from the ground up. We involved as many people as possible in the process, made efforts to
touch base with members individually, and did our best to ensure
that all voices were heard in the planning and strategizing process.
This openness not only ensured that rank-and-file members were
invested in the process, but also developed trust in the union negotiation team.
MFY’s unionized staff grew quickly and significantly during
this time—by approximately 29% in the six months prior to the
strike.78 This presented a number of organizing challenges. New
members would have to be brought up to speed quickly, incorporated into the union’s culture, and convinced that it was worth
making significant sacrifices for the future of an organization they
had only just joined. This rapid growth also resulted in some bad
working conditions, such as overcrowding and lack of adequate supervision.79 It is a testament to both new and experienced staff that
all of these goals were accomplished so quickly and that new members understood the stakes of the contract negotiation with such
clarity.
A.

Formulating Our Demands

MFY’s shop turned out to be well prepared and organized to
educate and bring brand new staff members into the bargaining
process. The shop formed a committee to poll shop members
about what they wanted out of our collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). We then met on multiple occasions to discuss the results of
the poll and refine our demands. We formed a pre-bargaining
78 See Brian Sullivan, Ready to Strike at MFY, SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://socialistworker.org/2015/01/27/ready-to-strike-at-mfy [https://perma.cc/
JRR9-WCWV].
79 See MFY Legal Services Employees on Strike, supra note 2.
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committee to take the lead in this work, and members of that committee took responsibility for various projects and tasks such as researching the Affordable Care Act, creating surveys and polls, and
analyzing MFY’s budget.
In formulating our bargaining demands and broader strategy,
we took significant efforts to uncover how women and people of
color were affected by working conditions at MFY and potential
contract terms. As a result, for example, we placed particular significance on our demands for pay equity for administrative support
staff.80 For the past decade, the vast majority of the administrative
staff at MFY has been women of color. They are also the lowest paid
staff in the organization and endure the most challenging working
conditions. A variety of factors affect support staff’s treatment
within the organization as a whole and, consequently, their engagement with the union. They include elitism, classism, racism, and,
practically speaking, greater oversight by and contact with managers that make support staff vulnerable to discipline. Unfortunately,
economic and social denigration are part of life for people of color
in the neoliberal United States,81 and this reality is reflected in our
organization. It is noteworthy that, for the past decade, no support
staff member has been promoted to an advocate or paralegal position. We therefore demanded pay equity for these employees and a
commitment to hire additional administrative staff to alleviate their
untenable workloads. And it was critical that an administrative staff
member sit on our negotiation team.
After significant organizing and discussion, we finalized a fivepage bargaining demand in which we listed a series of concrete
demands, each accompanied with a brief explanation of the principles underlying them. The demands were organized under three
major goals: improve the quality of MFY’s services, make MFY a
family-friendly workplace, and ensure that MFY hired and retained
a staff that reflects the communities we serve. Each category is explained in more detail below, but underlying all our demands was
the principle of solidarity. We made sure that the lowest paid workers, the most vulnerable, and the most in need would receive significant gains in negotiations, that better working conditions for staff
meant better services for our clients, and that the staff would not
be divided by age, experience, or parental status.
Taking each major area of principle in turn, we first wanted to
ensure that our clients would be served by an experienced, knowl80
81

See Sullivan, supra note 78.
See TAYLOR, supra note 22.
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edgeable, and truly diverse staff. The working conditions of MFY’s
staff have a direct impact on the services we provide and the work
we are able to do.82 Even though there is sharp debate about
whether the nonprofit sector can accomplish the sort of far-reaching reforms that poor and working class people need,83 it is beyond
serious dispute that, given the current economic climate, low-income people are in desperate need of the sort of services MFY provides. Although management often speaks as if staff demands pit us
against our clients, the exact opposite is true. The better our working conditions, the more diverse we remain as a staff, the longer we
practice, the more experience we gain, then the better we serve
our clients. In light of this solidarity between our staff and our clients, we fought to ensure that staff receive a compensation package
that would be competitive and appealing. Concretely, this meant
an increase in retirement contributions, no health care givebacks,
and fair raises. We also demanded greater transparency and accountability for decisions about our working conditions, more resources for training and professional development, and a
commitment to a truly welcoming workplace by holding an annual
anti-oppression training for all staff.
Second, we wanted to win pay equity for MFY’s lowest paid
staff. Administrative staff at MFY are not only paid less than any
other classification of workers, but also receive smaller wage increases for each year of experience they gain. For example, while
an attorney received a 3.6% raise upon her second anniversary of
employment, and a 6.6% raise on her third, administrative staff
only received 2.3% and 2.5%, respectively. The experience and
dedication of administrative staff was literally less valued. Especially
in light of the fact that the administrative staff is currently and has
historically been made up of mostly women of color, this discrepancy was an unacceptable injustice in our CBA. We also had to address an oversight in the prior contract negotiation that resulted in
the loss of funds that had been predominately used by our administrative staff to pay for college education and other training. Management had refused to contribute to these funds after the CBA
provision sunset, so the benefit had to be won again.
82 See generally Ian MacDonald, Beyond the Labour of Sisyphus: Unions and the City, 50
SOCIALIST REG. 247 (2014) (arguing for meaningful engagement between the labor
movement and the communities that workers serve).
83 See THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX 9-13 (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2009) (questioning
whether the nonprofit sector can accomplish the sort of movement building and farreaching reforms that the poor and working class need).
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Finally, we wanted to win real parental leave for all employees.
Prior to the strike, MFY offered only unpaid parental leave, a completely untenable option for the majority of employees. Instead of
dedicated paid parental leave, new parents had to cobble together
sick and vacation days. More than one shop member was
threatened with loss of health benefits when they tried to extend
their time with a new child by taking unpaid leave, a burden which
fell particularly hard on female shop members. This retrograde
policy left the organization far behind the curve, given that MFY
was the only legal services organization of its size providing no paid
parental leave.84
Of course, underlying all of these areas and at issue in almost
any labor campaign is respect for the workers. For our shop, management’s lack of respect manifested itself in various ways. For example, we were excluded from decisions that affected our day-today working conditions, such as how to configure our limited workspace to ensure that we are productive. Management further engaged in infantilizing practices, such as demonstrating an
unwillingness to allow staff to work from home despite a shortage
of workspace. Most importantly, management’s lack of respect was
exemplified by their failure to hire the additional administrative
staff necessary to adequately support our rapidly increasing casehandling staff.
B.

Starting Negotiations

After several months of preparation, we delivered our demands to management in late October 2015 and proposed a schedule of negotiation sessions by topic, starting with items that would
have the least economic impact.
We knew we were in for a fight when we received management’s response to our demands. Their response, and overall strategy, reflected the language of neoliberal austerity. They refused to
agree to discuss topics in any particular order. Claiming inade84 MFY Legal Services Staff Declare One-Day Strike in Protest, LSSA2320, http://
lssa2320.org/mfy-legal-services-staff-declare-one-day-strike-protest/ [https://
perma.cc/AQ3V-NWLG]; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEGAL
SERVICES STAFF ASSOCIATION NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL SERVICES WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION UAW, LOCAL 2320, AFL-CIO & LEGAL SERVICES NYC (July 1, 2012
– July 31, 2014), http://lssa2320.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CBA-with-NewIndex-w-MOA-July-2012-July-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL9E-BJTM]; ALAA CONTRACT 2013-2014: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATION OF
LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS, UAW 2325 (AFL-CIO) & THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY (NYC) (Mar.
31, 2014), https://alaa2325.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/final-2013-2014-alaa-contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3XX-AXNA].
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quate fiscal resources and uncertain times on the horizon, they demanded significant givebacks, including cuts to our health care,
job security, and an effective pay cut.85 Their opening offer included a considerably less generous economic package than the
prior contract negotiations despite the fact that MFY’s finances and
general economic conditions were much better. Most shockingly,
management demanded to limit the accrual of sick leave so that
they would not have to pay for long-term care for employees who
became terminally ill.86 They also demanded limitations on health
coverage for staff members’ children and for unmarried same-sex
domestic partners.
In addition to their false claims of MFY’s fiscal insecurity—the
organization had consistently seen annual budget surpluses, and its
fiscal reserves had increased by about $1.5 million (as adjusted for
inflation) over the prior seven years—management offered a number of rationales for their draconian demands.87 They pointed to
contracts that Mayor de Blasio’s administration had recently negotiated with a number of municipal unions, which contained low
raises and significant givebacks.88 They also claimed that MFY already offered a compensation package that was too rich and would
not allow the organization to competitively bid against other nonprofits for public and private grants. We discuss this race-to-thebottom mentality further below. The overall message was that
workers at MFY would have to live with worse benefits, lower pay,
and inferior working conditions. Implicit in this message, though
never acknowledged by management, was that our clients would
have to live with an inferior organization staffed by less experienced advocates. This message is not unique to MFY’s
management:
Despite knowing that our organizations are only as good as our
staff, for too many years legal services organizations have sat still
as our salaries became lower and lower in comparison to other
legal positions. The cost of law school has soared over the past
decades and the amount of debt that new lawyers have taken on
85 LSNYC & MFY Units Set Strike Deadline, LSSA 2320, http://lssa2320.org/lsnycmfy-units-set-strike-deadline/ [https://perma.cc/X526-N7C5].
86 See MFY Legal Services Staff Declare One-Day Strike in Protest, supra note 84.
87 See Sullivan, supra note 78 (“Changes in civil legal services funding at the state
and city level have led to an influx in cash. This influx resulted in massive hiring at
MFY—35 percent of the staff of the organization started in October 2014 or later.”).
88 Will Bredderman, De Blasio Cuts Contract Deal with NYCHA Teamsters Union for
Raises, Cost Cuts, OBSERVER (May 18, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://observer.com/2015/05/
de-blasio-cuts-contract-deal-with-nycha-teamsters-union-for-raises-cost-cuts/ [https://
perma.cc/X54L-LFCM].
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is staggering. This has caused chronic difficulties in recruiting
and retaining the best staff. Yet our community gave minimal
raises and pointed fingers at others. We were quick to look to
law schools and government programs and funders and suggest
that they needed to step in to help our low-paid, highly indebted
attorneys but slow to look at our own role in underpaying staff
and creating conditions that both hurt them and our
programs.89

At this point it became clear that we were going to do more
than fend off management’s bankrupt demands for givebacks—we
were going to ask for more. We were not going to be happy to inch
along, exchanging away our rights for a few paltry scraps. The staff
of MFY works incredibly hard to ameliorate the harshest conditions
that the neoliberalization of New York City has forced on our clients. We deserved better. More importantly, our clients deserved
better. Improved pay and working conditions make legal services a
more tenable and attractive long-term career, and we were going to
win a contract that included them.
C.

“Don’t get mad, get organized”: The Members Show Their Strength

The old labor adage “the boss is the best organizer” proved
true for us. After management delivered their unacceptable demand, our already organized and militant union got fired up and
ready for a fight. The staff implemented a series of escalating actions to highlight our concerns, respond to the disrespect regularly
communicated to us at the bargaining table, and make clear to
management how serious we were about our demands. When particular staff members experienced mistreatment or retaliation, dozens of shop members would file into our executive director’s office
to present a letter outlining our concerns. After one negotiation
session, staff members formed a “gauntlet” by lining both sides of
the hallway and staring down management’s negotiation team and
then cheering us as we walked out.90 We organized a picket and
action at the December meeting of the organization’s board of directors.91 The unionized staff of LSNYC came out in force to show
their solidarity, and three shop members addressed the board directly about the ways in which the entire staff felt disrespected by
management’s demands.
Later that month, the staff boycotted the annual holiday party
89 Kelly Carmody et al., Creating the Legal Services Organizations Our Clients Deserve:
Salaries and Beyond, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 329, 329 (2011).
90 See Sullivan, supra note 78.
91 Id.
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usually held every December, resulting in its cancellation for the
first time in recent memory.92 Instead we held our own party offsite that only enhanced our solidarity. In December we also began
lunchtime pickets, a great way to channel anger at the disrespect
we faced in the workplace and to build solidarity. When management failed to acknowledge in negotiations the numerous contributions and personal sacrifices the staff makes to ensure MFY’s and
its clients’ successes, we implemented a work-to rule, where staff
members consistently worked exactly thirty-five hours per week, the
weekly work hours set forth in our CBA.93 We picketed outside the
executive director’s home and flyered her neighbors and local
businesses. When there was still no meaningful movement by management to accept some of our demands or retract their more despicable ones, we held a one-day strike on January 12, 2015.94
It would be wrong, however, to give all credit for these inspiring and brave actions to the boss. While management’s unscrupulous approach to bargaining no doubt fueled the anger underlying
our militant actions, actually organizing that anger and deploying
it strategically took significant effort on behalf of the rank-and-file
leaders in the union.
First, the negotiation team made it a point to communicate
regularly and thoroughly with the entire shop through constant
email updates and weekly (or sometimes more frequent) in-person
meetings. Shop delegates facilitated communication between shop
members and the negotiation team and identified shop member
concerns before they became divisive. The consistent feedback
given to the negotiation team and the team’s regular and transparent communication back to the shop ensured that we were able to
maintain trust and have honest discussions that were key to our
shop’s solidarity.
The seriousness with which the negotiation team approached
regular meetings with members was mirrored in the high level of
participation from the rank and file. The majority of shop members attended meetings, debated seriously options on the table,
posed challenging questions to the team and to each other, and
maintained discipline even when there were disagreements about
Id.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEGAL SERVICES STAFF ASSOCIATION NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL SERVICES WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION
UAW, LOCAL 2320, AFL-CIO & MFY LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 15 (Jan. 1, 2012 – Dec. 31,
2015), http://lssa2320.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/MFY_CBA_2012to2014-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH42-B9BT].
94 MFY Legal Services Staff Declare One-Day Strike in Protest, supra note 84.
92
93
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particular actions. This resulted in wide and enthusiastic participation in each action, even by members who were hesitant to join
some of the more radical actions. When we did strike, not a single
member crossed the picket line.
The underlying point here is that while members placed great
trust in the negotiation team, the contract campaign was ultimately
propelled forward by the rank and file. While many examples illustrate this fact, here we will briefly discuss two.
First, at the very outset of bargaining, we told management
that whatever offer was on the table on January 15, 2015 would be
the offer we would vote on one week later. In years past, management had attempted to continue negotiating until the eleventh
hour, delivering a final offer sometimes hours before the union is
set to vote. This tactic denies staff an opportunity to seriously debate and consider an offer. Building a two-week buffer ensures that
the union has time to carefully weigh the final offer. In this round
of contract negotiations, MFY filed an Unfair Labor Practice complaint against LSSA for using this tactic.95 Nervous about how this
meritless claim might affect the bargaining process, the LSSA negotiation team considered scheduling extra negotiating sessions
with management to appease them. At a special shop meeting
called to discuss the matter, the negotiation team was told unequivocally not to take such action. Our spines suitably stiffened, we returned to the table, inspired by the shop’s courage to stick to our
original plan.
The second example involves an all-staff meeting we held in
December 2014, approximately one month before the deadline. In
that meeting we discussed what was on the table, what we wanted to
be sure to get out of bargaining, and how we were going to get
there. Members discussed and debated the merits of the union and
management offers, and ultimately hammered out the plan of escalating actions described above. People brainstormed ideas, discussed logistics, and debated larger questions. The meeting
ultimately resulted in a concrete plan that was ratified at a subsequent meeting. Without this rank-and-file-driven planning meeting, we would not have succeeded in our goals.
Arriving at this point meant debating some difficult questions.
One question that staff asked throughout negotiations and the
strike, a question that it was crucial to answer clearly, was why? Why
95 Charge, MFY Legal Servs., Inc. v. Legal Servs. Staff Ass’n, NLRB Case No. 02-CB144397 (filed Jan. 14, 2015) (on file with authors). The charge was later withdrawn
when the parties reached a final agreement.
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was MFY’s management attacking our health care and sick leave?
Why were they refusing to pay non-attorneys equitably, or to agree
that in the twenty-first century, workers should be entitled to parental leave? MFY’s management is made up mostly of life-long
public servants, people who have dedicated their careers to serving
low-income New Yorkers. So answering this question was key to understanding the basic dynamics of our dispute with management.
The answer to this question lies not in some moral failing on
the part of MFY’s management, but in the political and economic
context of our negotiations and the structure of legal services organizations. MFY is funded by City, State, federal, and private contracts, and must bid for these contracts in a market where the
organization competes against other legal services organizations.
In this competition there are real pressures to offer services at
cheaper rates. As we discussed above, this competitive market for
funding has been effectively used by both the Koch and Bloomberg
administration to quell radical politics.
This situation makes it easy for management to embrace a
race-to-the-bottom mentality. The organization must constantly win
new contracts to survive and must make competitive bids for those
contracts. Management is ill-equipped to resist the downward pressure of this dynamic. Unionized staff, on the other hand, is well
situated to resist this downward pressure. As front-line, case-handling staff, we directly observe how the deterioration of our working conditions leads to inferior client services. We also feel the pain
of the race to the bottom in our pocketbooks. Finally, we are members of a union, one of the greatest vehicles for fighting working
class oppression in world history.
To further complicate the matter, there is (at least potentially)
a divide between the management of a modern legal services organization and that organization’s board of directors.96 In his
book, The Politics of Rights, Stuart Scheingold discusses what he calls
the “activist bar”—those lawyers who “are interested in serving the
cause of change,” including its prospects and its opposition.97 He
notes that lawyers of private law firms, while setting up pro bono
programs to attract new graduates, cannot be dedicated to the ac96 Jeanette Zelhof, Exec. Dir., MFY Legal Servs., Address at MFY 50th Anniversary
Alumni Reunion, at 7:45-9:40 (2013), http://www.mfy.org/wp-content/uploads/
MFY-50th_small.mp3 (“[H]ousing in this richest city in the nation is effectively unaffordable to those people who are our clients; workers are exploited as never before;
and financial institutions are engaged in the greatest theft from the poor and working
poor not seen in most of our lifetimes.”).
97 SCHEINGOLD, supra note 13, at 190.
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tivist bar in the long term.98 MFY’s board, while requiring a certain
number of clients or former clients in its membership, is overwhelmingly comprised of partners and associates from large corporate firms. Regardless of board members’ political leanings,
opposition to the activist bar “can be shaped and deflected by cautious and conventional action programs.”99 Thus, legal services
programs are subjected to “pressures that can be effectively
mounted against both law reform and movement building—in
short, against the most promising signs of innovation.”100 This was
evident in the board’s concerns about framing gentrification as a
negative force affecting MFY’s clients in recent discussions of the
organization’s strategic plan. Some questioned whether MFY could
attract new board members serving certain industries if MFY explicitly set a goal to combat gentrification.
D.

Ready to Strike at MFY

After long months of negotiating, debating, and demonstrating our resolve, on January 30, 2015, the time finally came to vote
on management’s final offer. The week before, the negotiation
team had informed the staff that we would not be recommending
management’s offer. Crucially, management refused to offer pay
equity to non-attorneys, a benefits package that it acknowledged it
could afford, or an adequate parental leave policy. The union met
off-site at UAW offices in midtown Manhattan. After a brief discussion, we voted. With nearly 100% of the shop participating, 90%
voted in favor of striking.101
Though we could not have known that MFY’s management
would ultimately make such an unacceptable offer, preparation for
the strike had commenced weeks before the vote. Indeed, members would not have felt so confident to vote in favor of striking if
we had not been preparing in advance. In the preceding weeks we
had organized ourselves into several different committees, each
handling a different aspect of the strike. One committee prepared
press releases, contacted politicians, and drafted other external
statements. Another committee (perhaps the most popular) organized food for all of our meetings. The benefits committee ensured
that members were receiving strike benefits from the UAW or,
Id.
Id.
100 Id. at 191.
101 See MFY Legal Services Employees on Strike, supra note 2 (discussing MFY’s unionized employees’ overwhelming 90% vote to go on strike following their rejection of
management’s contract proposal).
98
99
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where possible, from City and State agencies. The hardship committee managed LSSA’s strike fund, providing financial assistance
to ensure that nobody would miss a rent payment or go hungry.
Crucial to giving our picket lines a vibrant and energetic feel was
the art committee, which wrote new slogans and emblazoned them
on signs that members would wear or hold up.
The committees ensured that every member was cared for during the strike, that we were tightly organized, and that we had a
clear line of communication with the press and politicians. By organizing ourselves into committees, we also ensured that the strike
would be run in a bottom-up fashion. Each committee operated
independently, making important decisions and fulfilling its function without extensive oversight from any central body. Simultaneously, the committees offered regular reports and updates to the
bargaining team and the shop as a whole. This well-oiled operation
allowed us to be flexible and created an environment in which the
entire membership could have productive strategy discussions.
Prior to the strike, our shop focused on organizing internally
and taking direct action targeting the board and management. After the strike began, our actions turned more outward to focus on
reaching out to political allies and honing our message in the
press. These actions were immensely successful. We received overwhelmingly positive media coverage, including in The New York Law
Journal and on Democracy Now’s newscast.102 Community based organizations and student groups also sent letters supporting the
union’s efforts, some of which were published in The New York Law
Journal.103
During the strike, LSSA members received indispensible support from the UAW. The international union provided members
with a weekly stipend, or strike pay. Because MFY cut our health
102 See Letter of support from CUNY Law Labor Coal. for Workers Rights and Econ.
Justice et al., Prolonged Bargaining Hurts MFY Clients, Staff, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202718260649/Prolonged-BargainingHurts-MFY-Clients-Staff?slreturn=20160124181638; Workers at NYC Legal Nonprofit Strike
over Pay, Family Leave, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.democracynow.
org/2015/2/3/headlines/workers_at_nyc_legal_nonprofit_strike_over_pay_family_
leave [https://perma.cc/MN24-Q388].
103 See, e.g., Letter of support from CUNY Law Labor Coal., supra note 102; Letter
from Deborah Glick, Assemblymember, New York Senate, Feb. 20, 2015, http://
lssa2320.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/New-York-State-AssemblymemberDeborah-Glick1.jpg [https://perma.cc/5MZA-CP4R]; Letter from The Unionized
Workers of Urban Justice Ctr. to Jeanette Zelhof, Exec. Dir., MFY Legal Servs. and
Robert Harwood, Partner, Harwood Feffer, LLP (Feb. 3, 2013), http://lssa2320.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Union-members-of-Urban-Justice-Center1.jpg [https:/
/perma.cc/R2W4-BRZK].
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insurance during the strike, the UAW insured all striking members.
Region 9A also provided helpful press and political contacts.
The day-to-day of the strike was divided into three main activities: picketing, committee meetings and activities, and shop-wide
meetings to strategize and discuss the latest developments at the
bargaining table. In spite of the extreme cold, we picketed most
days each week, sometimes dividing into smaller groups to hold
rallies near a particular target’s office or home. The frigid weather
prevented us from holding all-day picket lines, but we managed to
turn this potential disadvantage into a great strength. Shorter pickets meant more energetic pickets, and the enthusiasm of the shop’s
pickets was truly inspiring. Supporters who came out to pickets
commented on how organized we were, down to every member
knowing our chants. The democracy of the shop’s operations was
reflected in the chants themselves, which were led by a wide variety
of members who constantly rotated and shared the role.
On top of our picketing schedule, we reported to union headquarters almost every weekday. At headquarters we would have
committee meetings and shop-wide meetings, and would carry out
other activities, such as contacting the press or other unions in order to raise our strike’s visibility.
Key to the success of our picket lines was the support and solidarity we received. A wide range of groups, including ACT-UAW
Local 7902, the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys Local 2325,
Brandworkers International, CWA Local 1180, GSOC-UAW Local
2110, the IWW, National Writers Union-UAW Local 1981, the National Lawyers Guild NYC chapter, the NYC International Socialist
Organization, NYSNA, the CUNY Professional Staff Congress, Central Labor Council, the Rude Mechanical Orchestra, State Senator
Brad Hoylman, Assembly Member Dick Gottfried, Council Members Helen Rosenthal, Corey Johnson, and Stephen Levin, all came
out to support us at various times. We punctuated our regular pickets with a few “all-out” pickets that lasted well into the freezing
nights. These actions both energized the shop and demonstrated
how our strike resonated across the city with workers who were
tired of slowly deteriorating wages and working conditions.
Throughout the strike, we were also careful to maintain a clear
and confident political message. Although it helped that we supported each of our bargaining demands with clear principles, it was
nonetheless difficult at times. During negotiations, management’s
team suggested that our arguments regarding the racially problematic nature of their demands and strategy were inaccurate, divisive,

220

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:195

and made in bad faith. However, the management team ultimately
advanced no substantive arguments that successfully rebutted our
position. Therefore, despite pressure from our employer to soften
our public arguments on this point, we carried forward. The seriousness of the racial problems at MFY required it.
In the first week of the strike, management’s bargaining position did not change on any of the union’s most important demands. After our sustained and effective efforts, however, we began
to see progress. The crucial breakthrough came towards the end of
the second week of the strike, when management finally agreed to
our demands for pay equity for administrative staff. As with any
contract negotiation, the union also made some hard concessions.
Finally, in a marathon session on February 23, 2015, management made an offer that satisfied LSSA’s most important demands.
The management and board were most resistant to increased retirement contributions because of the long-term financial commitment this demand represented. The irony that we were dedicating
our careers to this work at a great financial sacrifice while the
board held out on agreeing to a .5% increase in our retirement
contributions was not lost on our shop.
Upon reaching a tentative deal at the bargaining table in the
fourth week of the strike, the chair of MFY’s board, Robert I. Harwood, told our negotiation team, “You guys did a good job for your
people.” A member of the union’s negotiating team responded
that she hoped the next time she saw him he would consider the
staff “his people” as well. We can only assume that the board’s general view of MFY’s staff is summarized by Mr. Harwood’s comment.
His comment reflects the belief that the people who carry out
MFY’s mission, the people who serve the organization’s clients on a
daily basis, are separate and distinct from the organization’s managers and board. It reflects the experience of our staff and explains
why it was crucial that the staff demand respect, transparency, and
accountability as part of its contract campaign.
E.

Taking the Fight Forward

Our strike and fight for a fair contract was, in turns, exhilarating, exhausting, inspiring, and intense. It gave us an opportunity to
work collaboratively and collectively with our co-workers, to witness
their talents, bravery, and resolve, and to forge the kind of connections that can only be made in struggle for a just cause. Our strike
also won benefits that will make MFY a leader in the legal services
field, including forty days of paid parental leave, large pay in-
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creases for non-attorneys, a benefits package that ensures our clients will be represented by experienced advocates, and measures
that will ensure that MFY is a diverse, respectful workplace.
Aside from the contract provisions themselves, the success of
this contract campaign and strike are readily apparent in our workplace. Our administrative staff is more engaged in our union, including support staff serving as shop delegates for the first time in
many years. Several staff members have already taken advantage of
paid parental leave without fighting for approval or worrying about
gaps in health coverage. Some members of the union have taken
the energy of the strike forward and formed an activism committee
that connects our union to other struggles around the city. In order to more effectively fight the oppression and marginalization
endemic to the neoliberal order, the unionized members of MFY
and LSNYC have identified a set of political priorities, including
the fight against racial injustice, gender and sexuality oppression,
and gentrification, which we will continue to organize around in
the future.
However, there are still goals of the contract campaign yet to
be achieved. Although MFY has more than doubled in size, we have
hired only one additional administrative support staff member in
the past several years. Management’s practices continue to reflect
distrust of staff and a general style that is more about power and
control than leadership that inspires and supports. Unfortunately,
the disrespect and disregard for the four staff members providing
administrative support to an organization of now nearly one-hundred people continues.
After we settled our contract at the end of February 2015, the
administration of Mayor Bill de Blasio dramatically increased funding for civil legal services. The long-term impact of this infusion of
City money remains to be seen, and it is clearly a welcome development for those of us in the field. However, this increase in funding
does not change the basic environment in which legal services advocates operate—one of continued austerity for working class and
poor New Yorkers.104 Furthermore, legal services organizations will
continue to bid for grant money in a competitive, market-like setting, ensuring that the managements of legal services organizations
will continue to adopt race-to-the-bottom negotiating tactics. In
104 In 2014, one year before de Blasio announced the new funding for legal services, Ian MacDonald predicted that municipal governments would couple large
handouts to developers with social services projects intended to secure the legitimacy
of the government and consent of the governed. See MacDonald, supra note 82.
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other words, the basic political economic context for the provision
of legal services has not changed.
A discussion of the sort of social movements that it would take
to change the neoliberal context in which we operate is beyond the
scope of this article. LSSA’s experience in its 2015 strike, however,
gives us a glimpse of what such movements might look like. They
would need to be based on solidarity, on the basic principle that an
injury to one of us is an injury to all of us. They will need to have
the courage to expand our political horizons, to ask more of the
City, State, and federal governments.
Focusing more narrowly on legal services, to the extent that
our contract campaign represents a broader movement in the
field, it represents the rejection of the race to the bottom.105 Antipoverty advocates could be significantly more effective in pressing
for expanded funding if MFY’s board and management formed a
united front with the union to advocate for increased resources to
ensure the highest quality of legal services. Instead, by forgoing
such a position, MFY’s management and board have taken a stance
that relegates legal services to less and supports a trend of reliance
on volunteerism and unbundled legal services.106 LSSA, however,
plans to continue to fight to improve our working conditions and
the lives of our clients.
The 2015 strike against MFY will, however, stand out as a moment of raised expectations in legal services. It was a moment in
which we dared to reject austerity and fight for more—more for
ourselves and more for our clients. The struggle continues.

See Carmody et al., supra note 89, at 329.
See Fern Fisher-Brandveen & Rachel Klempner, Unbundled Legal Services: Untying
the Bundle in New York State, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1107-14 (2002).
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